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INTRODUCTION
      In domestic disputes family members and sexual partners may be motivated to record 
telephone conversations or access e-mail or voicemail communications to protect their 
perceived self-interest or out of spite and anger.  The unauthorized access of the content 
of conversations or communications in domestic disputes is an invasion of any non-
consenting person’s privacy.  In this article I examine whether such invasions of privacy 
are legally justified.
         The full extent of intra-family eavesdropping is not determinable for obvious 
reasons.  Persons generally have no way of knowing whether their conversations are 
surreptitiously listened to.  A successful eavesdropper does so in secret.  Even if the 
invasion of privacy is discovered the victim may be reluctant to come forward because of 
the potentially embarrassing content of the conversation.  Currently there is no national 
commitment to study the extent of illegal eavesdropping in the United States.  An 
important study of a national commission reviewing laws relating to electronic 
*
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2surveillance published in 1976 suggested that illegal surveillance in marital and domestic 
disputes was a significant problem.  The study indicated that 79% of the illegal 
wiretapping reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for which a motive 
could be identified involved surveillance by spouses, parents or those in courtship.1
Many of these illegal surveillances were instituted with the advice of an attorney and the 
assistance of a private detective.2   Clearly electronic surveillance of conversations in 
marital and custody disputes is not uncommon.  The increase in court adjudications of 
electronic eavesdropping arising from domestic disputes suggests that these activities 
may be on the rise.  It is also clear that spouses are accessing e-mail and tracking 
computer use in connection with domestic disputes.
The legality of electronic surveillance of conversations and accessing of e-mail is 
complicated.  Several legal institutions are implicated by these activities.  Section I of this
article identifies the values that are at stake when electronic surveillance is employed in 
marriage and custodial disputes.  Section II examines the legality of   electronic 
surveillance in domestic disputes  under  state and federal wiretap and stored 
communications acts and the common law privacy intrusion tort.  Section III  examines  
the extent to which the fruits of violations of wiretap and stored communications acts or 
the privacy intrusion tort are excluded from divorce and custody proceedings.  Section IV 
examines the availability of protective orders and other legal tools which minimize the 
scope of legal electronic surveillance and provide some protection against invasions of 
1 National Comm’n For The Review of Fed. & State Laws Relating to Wiretapping and Elec. Surveillance, 
Electronic Surveillance 161 (1976).  (hereafter National Commission).  The Commission was created 
pursuant to a mandate in Section 804 of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1968.  Unfortunately there has 
been no subsequent commissions or other governmental bodies that have updated the data in the national 
Commission Report of 1976.
2 See id.
3privacy to innocent participants of conversations or communications that are acquired in 
legal intra-family surveillance.
I.  VALUES AT STAKE IN MARITAL AND CUSTODIAL SURVEILLANCE
     Important values are implicated when conversations, communications and images are 
surreptitiously tape recorded or videotaped.  Conversational privacy is an important form 
of informational and physical privacy.  By "informational privacy" I mean a condition, 
value, interest or right that embodies a concern about limiting access to one’s personal 
affairs.  Physical privacy is the right to decide who shall have access to a physical space 
or physical access to one’s body.  Informational privacy and physical privacy sometimes 
collapse into each other.  Hiding a tape recorder in someone’s bedroom invades both 
informational and physical privacy.3
     Conversational privacy is valued on both intrinsic and instrumentalist grounds.4  Some
commentators and jurists view privacy as a value  that is essential to our status as persons 
with dignity rights.  Limiting who has acquaintance with the content of one’s 
conversation is a feature of the dignity that is essential to personhood.  An influential 
voice in explicitly connecting   privacy and respect for persons was the philosopher 
Stanley Benn5.  Benn contends that the essence of the wrong that occurs through 
invasions of privacy from unlicensed observations of someone is lack of respect for the 
3 For a more general account of my views on informational privacy see TURKINGTON AND ALLEN, 
PRIVACY LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 77 (West Group 2002).
4 For a general account of the various  views of privacy as a value that is an intrinsically good and  as a 
value that is instrumentally good because of what privacy does for other important values see TURKINGTON 
& ALLEN, supra  note 3, at 27, 29.
5 See Benn, Freedom and Respect for Persons , in Nomos XIII: Privacy (1971).
4subject as a person.  Under this view, surreptitious acquisition of the contents of a 
conversation is a “blow to human dignity.”6
In addition to being intrinsically valuable, conversational privacy is also 
important because it is an instrument for furthering other important values.  Expecting 
that what one says to others is private is essential for entering into and altering personal, 
intimate and political  associations.7  As some jurists have observed, “ [n]o one talks to a 
recorder as he talks to a person.”8  Moreover, privacy in conversations promotes 
spontaneous expressions of thoughts and emotions that make it possible for others to 
know an individual and for that individual to know others.  Conversational privacy is also 
viewed as essential to the formation of self identity and personality.  The same arguments 
and values apply to the importance of privacy in communications like e-mail that do not 
involve the human voice.9
   A. Countervailing Values
The countervailing values that are asserted to justify encroachments on 
conversational and communication privacy in marital and custodial electronic 
6 See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity : An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 
N.Y.U.. L. REV. 962, 974  (1964) (characterizing eavesdropping. wiretapping and the unwanted entry into 
one’s house as a “blow to human dignity.”); see also TURKINGTON AND ALLEN, supra note 3, at 50-52 
(providing a general account of the dignity and respect for person foundations of privacy law).
7 See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 ( 1972) ( holding that the President did not 
have the inherent power to wiretap phones of  United States citizens); Commonwealth v. Blood, 507 
N.E.2d 1029 (Liacos, J.) ( Mass. 1987) (noting Massachusetts law prohibits unreasonable searches and 
seizures violated  by electronic surveillance of  conversations in the home unless all of the parties have 
consented); see also, Bartnicki v. Vopper. 532 U.S. 514, 532 (2001) (recognizing the role of privacy in 
communications in “uninhibited exchange of ideas” amongst citizens).
8 See Blood, 507 N.E. 2d at 1036 (Liacos, J.) (quoting  Holmes v. Burr, 486 F.2d 55, 72 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(Hufstedler, J., dissenting).
9 See generally Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living with Anonymity, 
Digital Cash, and Distribted Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395 (1996); Donald J. Karl, State Regulation of 
Anonymous Internet Use, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513 (1998); TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 3, at 450.
5surveillance cases are parental autonomy in child rearing, the best interests of the child 
and the integrity of the fact finding process in divorce and custody proceedings. 
 Parental autonomy in decisions involving the rearing and upbringing of their 
children is a longstanding value in the United States.10  Until the age of majority parents 
have the authority to decide most decisions for their children.  This parental autonomy 
may include deciding to invade the informational and physical privacy of their children.  
With minor children legally incapable of consent, parents have autonomy to access their 
children’s health records and consent to physical invasions of privacy through beneficial 
medical procedures.  However, parental autonomy in child rearing is not absolute.  In  
some cases parental decisions are overridden where the decision is not in the physical or 
emotional best interests of the child.11  The best interests of the child may also override 
the informational and physical privacy values of the parents.  Where a question of 
physical or sexual abuse has been raised in psychiatric examination of a parent the 
privacy and confidentiality of health information gives way to the interest in the physical 
and psychological well being of the child.12
10 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding parents have right to control the content of their 
children's education); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding Wisconsin compulsory public 
school attendance law interfered with parent's rights to religious expression protected by First 
Amendment).
11
 One example not the focus of this article would be where the child’s life would be saved with a blood 
transfusion and the parents religious beliefs forbid the procedure.   See , e.g. State v. Rogers, 20 P.3d 166, 
169 (Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (discussing compelling interest of state in preserving lives of children).
12
  Originally states adopted laws requiring physicians to report suspected physical and sexual abuse to 
authorities.  Today, most states have greatly extended the scope of this duty to mental health professionals.  
The duty of both physicians and mental health professionals is triggered where there is a reasonable basis 
for suspicion of abuse.  Moreover, some jurisdictions impose criminal liability for a failure to disclose such 
information to the proper authorities.  For a more in depth analysis of the issues surrounding disclosure of 
confidential communications in psychotherapy see RICHARD C. TURKINGTON & ROBERT M. WETTSTEIN, 
CONFIDENTIALITY LAW AND THE TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE IN PSYCHIATRY, reprinted from PSYCHIATRY 
(Robert Michaels, et al., eds. Rev. ed 1996/1997)
6B.  Some of the Complexities in Accommodating Values in Spousal or Parental 
Electronic Surveillance Cases
There are several features of parental or spousal electronic surveillance that  make 
the accommodation of values complicated and hard in some cases.  
1.  The Inherent Pervasiveness of Electronic Surveillance
  Electronic surveillance through a wiretap or bug is inherently pervasive.  A   
wiretap, bug , the downloading of a person’s e-mail or voicemail breaches the 
conversational and communication privacy of all non consenting persons that are talking 
on the telephone or are a part of the conversation or e-mail communication.  Even if there 
are justifications for invading the privacy of a targeted person the privacy of non-targeted 
persons is invaded.  Persons whose privacy is invaded without justification are innocent 
victims of the inherent pervasiveness of electronic surveillance technology.  Electronic 
surveillance may  provide access to and extra-judicial disclosure of highly personal and 
intimate information of innocent persons.  In the sections that follow I contend that the
pervasive nature of electronic surveillance is not adequately accounted for in much of the 
law on electronic surveillance.  When adequately taken into account the pervasive nature 
of electronic surveillance may push the accommodation of values in favor of 
conversational and communication privacy .  
2. Parental Autonomy, The Best Interests of the Child , and Minor Autonomy      
Parental autonomy to electronically eavesdrop on the conversations or 
7communications of a minor child is limited when the surveillance is not in the best 
interest of the child or where the surveillance violates the minor’s autonomy to converse 
or communicate.  As observed above, the best interests of the child may override parental 
choices on childrearing and parental informational privacy values.  Beyond this there is 
an emerging tradition in our legal system to grant minors self determination in respect to  
decisions that have traditionally been left exclusively to parents.13  Much of the 
discussion in commentary and law focuses on  empirical studies that suggest that minors 
are competent to make important decisions at ages much earlier than traditional legal 
ages of majority.14  Statutes have been enacted in several states providing for “mature 
minors” to have the right to informed consent for medical treatment and psychotherapy.15
In psychotherapy the right of a minor’s informed consent for treatment is thought by 
psychotherapist to facility mental health treatment.16  The importance of this recent 
development is that the rigid historic view that parents have autonomy over dependent 
children until they reach the age of eighteen  or twenty-one is being replaced in some 
states by a flexible view that minors reaching a level of competency have right to decide 
certain matters for themselves.   This changing landscape of minor autonomy and the 
13 See Kellie Smidt,  Who Are You To Say What My Best Interest Is? Minors Due Process Rights When 
Admitted by Parents for Inpatient Mental Health Treatment, 71 Wash. L. Rev. 1187 (1996) for a 
background on the changing landscape of minors’ right to consent for treatment.
14 See Richard E. Redding, Due Process Protections for Juveniles in Civil Commitment Proceedings 24 
(1991).  For a source of  state law that demonstrates the variable ages adopted by legislation for minors’ 
consent, see National Survey of State Laws, 405-418  ( 2d Ed. 1997).
15 See Tania E. Wright A Minor’s Right to Consent to Medical Care, 25 Howard L. Review 525, 528-538 ( 
l982) ( arguing for drastic legislative reform of minor consent law in view of inconsistent and inadequate 
common law and legislative rules. 
16 See Redding, supra, note 14 at p.
8limitations on parental autonomy where the best interests of the child are at stake need to 
be taken into account in parental electronic eavesdropping cases.
II. FEDERAL AND STATE WIRETAP AND STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACTS AND THE 
COMMON LAW PRIVACY INTRUSION TORT
The importance of conversational and communication privacy values is reflected 
in several legal institutions that are brought to bear in parental and spousal electronic 
surveillances cases.  Three of these are federal and state wiretap and stored 
communications acts and the common law privacy intrusion tort.
                                    A. Background on Federal Wiretap Law
Recording telephone and face-to-face conversations, accessing e-mail and 
voicemail are primarily regulated by federal and state wiretap and stored communications 
statutes.  The wiretap statute is notorious for its lack of clarity.17   I think it is helpful to 
begin by laying foundations about the basic concepts and structure of federal law and 
identifying areas where there is some clarity.
In 1928 the Supreme Court held that a government wiretap was not a search under 
the Fourth Amendment in Olmstead v. United States.18  Chief Justice Taft writing for the 
majority concluded there was no search because the electronic device attached to the wire 
17 See United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that this characterization by the 
Fifth Circuit of  the federal wiretap statute may have been too generous).
18
  277 U.S. 438 (1928).
9outside of Olmstead’s home did not amount to a physical trespass.19 The Court did 
note, however, that the privacy of telephone conversations could be protected by direct 
legislation.20  Congress responded in 1934 by enacting the Federal Communications Act
(FCA).  Section 60421 of the FCA's prohibition on intercepting conversations was limited 
in several ways.  Evidence obtained in violation of the FCA could be admitted in state 
court.  In addition, the Justice Department and FBI interpreted section 605 to only 
prohibit wiretaps that were “divulged.”22 Finally, the Supreme Court severely limited
application of section 605 in transmission monitoring or “bugging” cases that did not 
involve wiretapping by imposing a trespass requirement on these forms of electronic 
eavesdropping.23
In 1967 the Supreme Court junked the trespass concept of a Fourth Amendment 
search and reversed Olmstead v. United States24.  In Katz v. United States25 the Court 
19 Id. at 464-65 (noting that because the evidence was obtained only through hearing, there was no illegal 
seizure).  The physical trespass notion of a Fourth Amendment search was junked by the Supreme Court 
almost forty years later in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
20 Id. at 465 (noting that Congress could protect wire communications by making them inadmissible in 
judicial proceedings).
21
  Federal Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934) (amended by 47 U.S.C. § 
605 (1968)).
22 See, e.g. Herbert Brownell, Jr. The Public Secrecy and Wiretapping, 39 Corn. L. Rev. 195, 197-99 
(1954); John Decker & Joel Handler, Electronic Surveillance Standards, Restrictions, and Remedies, 12 
Cal. W. L. Rev. 60, 163 (1975).
23 Compare On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (no violation of section 605 where a 
conversation is recorded by someone who is “wired for sound") with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 
505 (1961) (section 605 not applicable where the government used a foot-long spike microphone to record 
a conversation). 
24
 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
25 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz involved the attachment of an electronic transmitter to 
telephone booth that Katz was conversing from and is a transmission  monitoring case.  Earlier during the 
same term the Court had assumed that a government wiretap was a Fourth Amendment search in Berger v. 
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (construing portions of the New York wiretap statute as unconstitutional 
under the Fourth Amendment).
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held that electronic surveillance of a conversation by the government  constituted a 
search if the person had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation.  This  
shift from a trespass based notion of a Fourth Amendment search to one based on an 
individual's expectation of privacy was paradigmatic.  Katz ushered in the modern era of 
informational privacy law.  As discussed later in this article, the expectation of privacy 
principle as employed by courts since Katz is fraught with problems.  But the idea that a
legally recognized expectation of privacy is the sina qua non for  prima facie privacy 
protection permeates informational privacy law in the private and public sector.26
      Partially in response to the limited protection provided within section 605 and the 
emergence of constitutional protection for conversational privacy after Katz, Congress 
enacted the first comprehensive federal statute regulating virtually all forms of electronic 
surveillance of conversations.  Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street 
Acts of 1968 nationalized the law of federal, state and private electronic surveillance of 
conversations.27  This statute was commonly referred to as the “Wiretap Act” or “Title 
III.”
Congress enacted Title III with several objectives in mind.  Clearly Title III was 
designed to establish the authority and standards for government wiretaps for criminal 
law investigations.  There is a particular concern expressed in the legislative history over 
the need to clarify government electronic eavesdropping authority to respond to the 
perceived growing threat of organized crime.  In addition, Title III was enacted for the 
26 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P. 2d 469, (Cal. 1998).
27 See generally Jeremiah Courtney, Electronic Eavesdropping, Wiretapping and Your Right to Privacy, 26 
FED. COMM. B.J. 1 (1973); James G. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance (2001).
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purpose of protecting private individuals against wiretapping in domestic disputes and to 
protect against various forms of wiretapping in the business sector.  The concern over 
protecting conversational privacy in the private sphere was reflected by the extension of 
Title III's prohibition against intercepting conversations to “any person,”28 by providing 
for minimal liquidated damages,29 a strong exclusionary rule30 and the right to recover 
attorneys’ fees and court costs for all violations.31
Title III only protected conversational privacy.  This limitation was contained in 
the prohibition against interception of “wire or oral” communications.  Wire 
communications were those involving the human voice that were transmitted from the 
point of origin to the point of reception through the use of wire.32  Conversing on the 
telephone is the paradigm of a “wire communication.”  Face-to-face conversations are the 
paradigm of an “oral communication.”  A wiretap is the paradigm of an interception of a 
wire communication; bugging a conversation through a tape recorder or transmitter is the 
paradigm of interception of an oral communication.  Title III generally prohibited the 
interception of a wire or oral communication without a court order33 unless one of the 
parties has consented.34
28 See 18 U.S.C.A.  § 2511(1) (West 2000).
29
 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (West 2000).
30
  18 U.S.C. § 2515 (West 2000).
31
  18 U.S.C. § 2520 (West 2000).
32
  The 1968 version of the Wiretap Act restricted wire communications to those transmitted by telephone 
companies licensed by the FCC.
33
  Court ordered surveillance is limited to law enforcement bugs or wiretaps.  Section 2518 establishes 
strict requirements for court authorized interceptions of wire communications.
34
  The consent defenses are found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2511(2)(c) and (d).
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B. Enter the 1986 Electronic Communications Act:  The ECPA
In 1986 the federal statute was amended by The Electronics Communications Privacy 
Act (ECPA)35 Congress enacted Title III to deal with the  current communications of 
conversations over wire (by telephone) and face-to-face in 1968.During the decades    
following the passage of Title III, communication technology changed dramatically.  By 
1986 many communications were transmitted by means other than the telephone or face-
to-face conversations and by systems owned and managed entities that were not licensed 
common carriers.  Today many conversations are transmitted by radio signals through 
cellular systems or cordless phones.  Many companies have private phone systems which 
they tie into the systems of common carriers.  There is increasing use of digital 
technology to electronically communicate through electronic mail and facsimile 
machines
The amendments to the Wiretap Act which resulted from the 1986 passage of the 
ECPA responded to the technological advances that had developed since 1968.  The 
response to the new technology is embodied in the addition of the concept of “electronic 
communication” to the statute.36  The ECPA generally prohibits the interception of, and 
unauthorized access to, stored electronic communications.  This addition brings the 
surveillance of digitally transmitted conversations, electronic mail, cellular phones and 
pen registers within the regulatory reach of the statute.  While t he ECPA restructured and 
35
  The ECPA is found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-3127 (1994).
36 See Committee on the Judiciary, The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 H.R. Rep. No. 
99-647, at 2 (1986).
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extended federal law in important ways37,  the 1986 amendments also added to the 
confusion surrounding the Wiretap Act.  Out of habit some courts and commentators 
continue to speak of the federal statute as “Title III.”  That is not technically correct.  The 
ECPA Amendments now divide the Wiretap Act into Title I, II and III.  The former Title 
III is now Title I of the ECPA.  Title I38 of the ECPA (or the Wiretap Act) now regulates 
the interception of conversations.  Title II39 of the ECPA  (or the Stored Communications 
Act) regulates access to e-mail, fax communications and voicemail.  Title III40 of the 
ECPA regulates call-tracing devices such as caller ID.  The two titles most relevant to 
this discussion are Title I and Title II.  I will refer to Title I as the “Wiretap Act” or “Title 
I” and Title II as the “Stored Communications Act" or “Title II.”41
C. ECPA’s Scope and Remedies
The Wiretap and Stored Communications Acts apply to both government and 
private action.  The Wiretap Act imposes criminal and civil liability for intentional 
interceptions of all types of conversations by an electronic or mechanical device.42
The Wiretap Act provides for recovery of both actual and punitive damages.43  In 
37
  For a general analysis of restructuring of the Wiretap Act by the ECPA, see TURKINGTON & ALLEN, 
supra note 3, at 294.
38
  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2510-2522 (West 2000).
39
  18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (West 2000). 
40
  18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (West 2000).
41
 See generally, Turkington and Allen, supra note 3, at 294-397.
42
 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (West 2000).
43
  State statutes have similar damage rules.  See, e.g. M.G. v. J.C., 603 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 
1992) (upholding $50,000 punitive damage award against husband for violation of the New Jersey 
Wiretapping Act).
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addition, minimal liquidated damages of $10,000 may be imposed for violations of 
the Wiretap Act.44 Moreover, the Wiretap Act also contains a strong exclusionary 
rule prohibiting courts and administrative agencies from admitting into evidence the 
content of taped conversations that are acquired in violation of the statute.45
Attorneys’ fees and court costs are also available to the prevailing party.
Similarly to the Title I, the Stored Communications Act applies to both 
government and private action as well as providing actual and punitive damages.  But the 
liquidated damages are less – only $1,000,46 and most importantly, there is no 
exclusionary rule for violations of Title II .47  Both Title I and Title II of the ECPA 
preempt state laws that provide less security for conversations and electronic 
communications.  But state laws can provide for greater security.  For example, if one 
party consents to the recording of a conversation there is no violation of Title I of the 
ECPA.  But in states like Florida,48 Pennsylvania,49 Maryland,50 and California51 both 
44
  18 U.S.C. § 2520.  The minimum liquidated damage amount was changed in 1986 (with the ECPA 
amendments) from $1,000 to $10,000.  Language in section 2520 was changed from “shall be entitled to 
damages” to a court “may” assess damages.  Most courts have viewed the change to mean that awarding 
damages is discretionary and do not award damages for de minimis violations of Title I.  See Goodspeed v. 
Harman, 39 F. Supp. 2d 787, 791 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
45
  18 U.S.C. § 2515.
46
  18 U.S.C. § 2707(c).
47
  No exclusionary rule is specifically found in Title II and section 2708 states that “remedies and sanctions 
described in this chapter are the only judicial remedies and sanctions for non-constitutional  violations of 
this chapter.”  See 18 U.S.C. § 2708 (West 2000).
48
  Fla. Stat. Ann. § 934.03(3)(d) (West 2000).
49
  18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5704(4) (West 1983 & Supp. 1998).
50
  Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-402(C)(3) (1998).
51
  Cal. Penal Code § 631(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 1998).
15
parties must consent for the recording of a conversation by private parties to be legal 
under the applicable state wiretap law.
D.  Interspousal Recording of Conversations in the Marital Home
As noted above, telephone conversations (including those communicated over cell 
phones) are “wire communications” under the Wiretap Act.  Title I specifically prohibits 
“any person” from intercepting a wire communication without a court order or the 
consent of one of the parties to the conversation.52   Despite the absence of any express 
exception in the Wiretap Act for the nonconsensual tape recording by one spouse of 
another spouse’s conversation, some courts have carved out a limited exception for 
interspousal taping of telephone conversations in the marital home.  This exception is 
sometimes referred to by commentators as the “interspousal” or “marital/domestic” 
conflict exception to Title I.
In 1974 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals exempted some interspousal electronic 
surveillance from the Federal Wiretap Act.  In Simpson v. Simpson53, the court held that 
the recording of telephone conversations in the marital home by a husband who suspected 
his wife of infidelity did not violate Title I.  The plain language of Title I does not 
provide for an interspousal/marital conflict exception.  Section 2511 imposes criminal or 
civil responsibility on “any person” who willfully intercepts a telephone conversation.  
The Simpson court, however, found an implied exception for interspousal wiretapping on 
the basis that Congress did not intend for the Wiretap Act to be thrust into marital 
52
  18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2511, 2511(2)(d).
53
  490 F.2d 803 (5th Cir. 1974).
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controversies or to override state interspousal tort immunity.  The court also found that 
the exception in the statute for ordinary use of an extension phone by the subscriber 
supported excluding spousal eavesdropping from coverage of the Wiretap Act.  [The 
ordinary use of an extension phone exemption is examined more fully in the section on 
parental eavesdropping that follows.]  Simpson has been followed in only one other 
federal circuit.54  Most of the federal circuits follow the plain language of the ECPA and 
have not recognized an interspousal exception for wiretapping in the marital home.55  The 
majority of courts have also interpreted state wiretap acts to not include an interspousal 
exception for wiretapping in the marital home.56
1.  Limited to Spousal Eavesdropping in the Martial Home
In those jurisdictions where an interspousal exception has been recognized the 
exception has been limited to eavesdropping by the spouse in the marital home .57
Persons who assist the spouse in eavesdropping in the marital home (such as a private 
detective) are liable under Title I even though the spouse is not.58
2.  “Bugging Conversations” in the Marital Home
54 See Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1977).
55 See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976); Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 
1991); Kempf v. Kempf, 868 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1989); Pritchard v. Pritchard, 732 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1984).
56 See James G. Carr, The Law of Electronic Surveillance § 3.6, at 3-163 (Release # ? 3/2002); at least one 
state wiretap act has been interpreted to contain an interspousal wiretap exception; Wright v. Stanley, 700 
So. 2d 274 (Miss. 1997).
57 See Anonymous, 558 F.2d at 679 (distinguishing Sixth Circuit case where spouse no longer resided in 
marital home); Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 (noting Title I reflects "Congress's intention to abjure from 
deciding a very intimate question of familial relations, that of the extent of privacy family members may 
expect within the home vis-a-vis each other."). 
58
 See Simpson, 490 F.2d at 809 (noting others may still be liable even if spouse is not).
17
Face-to-face conversations are “oral communications” under the Wiretap Act.  
Therefore, the placing of a recording device, commonly referred to as a "bug", in a room 
or on a person for the purpose of recording face-to-face conversations is subject to 
regulation under Title I as an interception of an oral communication.  Where the 
recording device is used to record the face-to-face conversations of a spouse and another 
adult in the marital home the result would be identical to the recording of a telephone 
conversation.  If the jurisdiction recognizes an interspousal exception it would apply to 
the “bugging” as well.  If there was no recognized exception the “bugging” would be 
illegal.  As explained in the section that follows, the wiretapping and bugging of a 
conversation of a parent/child conversation is subject to a somewhat different analysis.
E.  Parental Tape Recording of Conversations of Children
The parental tape recording of conversations between a child and a third party 
(generally the other parent) is not uncommon where there is a custody dispute.59  In such 
cases the taping is regarded as more permissible under federal and state wiretap laws.  
This is due to courts' propensity to treat the recording as within the ordinary extension 
use exception to the wiretap statute or view the parent as having authority to vicariously 
consent for the child.
i.  The Extension Phone Exception
Title I contains a narrow exception for electonic eavesdropping over an extension 
phone that is done for the ordinary use of the subscriber (the extension phone or ordinary 
59 See Jonathan E. Niemeyer, Note, All in the Family:  Interspousal and Parental Wiretapping Under Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control Act, 81 KY. L.J. 237, 247 (1993).
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use exception).  The ordinary use exception has arisen mostly in cases where an employer 
records the conversations of employees on an extension phone.60  However, because of 
testimony in the legislative history of the Wiretap Act, some courts have applied the 
doctrine in cases involving custodial parents recording the conversations of their children.  
In hearings before the House Judiciary Committee on the scope of the ordinary use 
exception to the wiretap Act, Professor Herman Schwartz, speaking on behalf of the 
ACLU stated, “I take it nobody wants to make it a crime for a father to listen in on his 
teenage daughter …."61   This language has been invoked by courts to support a parental
eavesdropping exception under federal and state statutes for recording conversations on 
the extension phone of a child in the family home.62
Recognition of a marital conflict and parental extension phone exception for 
electronic surveillance under the Wiretap Act has been limited and subject to 
considerable critical commentary.63  The marital conflict exception is distinctly a 
minority rule and has been roundly criticized as unwarranted in view of the plain 
language and legislative history of the Wiretap Act.64  Most state courts have not 
60 See, e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding employer liable for recording 
employee’s telephone conversations on an extension phone because recording exceeded narrow scope of 
ordinary business use of extension phone exception).  The ordinary course of business exception is found  
in section 2510(5)(a)(i) which exempts electronic surveillance “by the subscriber or user in the ordinary 
course of its business” from regulation under Title I of the ECPA.  See id. at 1157 (noting source of 
extension phone exception). 
61
  Hearings on the Anti-Crime Program Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Judiciary Comm. 90th Cong. 
1st Sess. 901 (1967).
62 See Scheib v. Grant, 22 F.3d 149, 154 (7th Cir. 1994); Newcomb v. Ingle,  944 F.2d 1534, 1536 n.5 
(10th Cir. 1991); Anonymous v. Anonymous, 558 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir. 1977).
63
  For the general criticism of the marital and parental exception, see, James Carr, The Law ofElectronic 
Surveillance, § 3.6 (Release # 30 3/2002).
64 Id.  A thorough trashing of the arguments of the Simpson court is found in Judge Celebrezze’s opinion in 
United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1976), discussed supra.  See also the arguments of the court in 
Kratz v. Kratz. 477 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1979).  Both decisions find the analysis of Judge Bell in 
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recognized a marital conflict exception.65  Many courts have also rejected the telephone 
extension exception as applied to the tape recording of conversations.66  But a potentially 
much broader exception has recently been recognized by courts that reject both the 
marital and telephone extension phone exception.67  This new exception would authorize 
parental electronic eavesdropping by granting a parent the authority to vicariously 
consent for a minor child and thereby provide a defense to the Federal Wiretap Act and 
those state wiretap acts that allow for electronic surveillance of conversations if one party 
has consented.
ii. Vicarious Consent
The Wiretap Act is not violated if a party to the intercepted conversation has 
consented.  This one party consent rule is mirrored in most state wiretap statutes.  
Parents/guardians of minors have the authority to vicariously consent for the minor when 
it is perceived by the parent to be in the best interests of the child.  Does the parental  
authority to consent for the child under state law include consenting to the surreptitious 
recording of a conversation between the child and a third person?  If state law allows a 
parent to vicarious consent for their child in respect to decisions such as whether to be 
subject to a particular medical procedure, does that authority provide a consent defense 
under Title I?  Does the authority for a parent to consent for the child under state law 
include consenting to the surreptitious recording of a conversation between a child and 
Simpson v. Simpson to be without support in the language, legislative history or purposes of the Wiretap 
Act. 
65 See footnotes 94, 95 and accompanying text.
66 See Thompson v. Dulaney, 970 F.2d (10th Cir. 1992), Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 1998).
67 Id,
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the other parent?  Courts have generally answered both of these questions affirmatively 
and have been increasingly willing to apply a vicarious consent defense to parental 
eavesdropping.
The Tenth Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to suggest vicarious 
consent was a defense under the Wiretap Act in Thompson v. Dulaney.68 During the 
pendency of a divorce, Denise Dulaney taped several conversations between the father 
and their minor children while she and her children were living in her parents’ home.69
Dulaney had the tapes transcribed and distributed them to her family, attorney and expert 
witnesses.70  Two of the transcripts were admitted in the deposition of an expert witness 
during the custody litigation.71 Thompson, the father, brought a damage action under 
Title I against his wife, her parents, experts and attorney for taping and divulging the 
contents of recorded conversations between himself and his children.72
The district court exempted the recordings under the interspousal exception.73
The Tenth Circuit, in an earlier case, had rejected the view that there was an interspousal 
exception to Title I and reversed the district court on this issue.74  However, the court 
remanded the case to the district court to determine whether consent was a defense to the 
Title I action on the basis that the custodial parent had the authority to vicariously 
68
  970 F.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1992).
69 See id. at 746.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 747.
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consent for the child under state law.75 On remand, the district court found that the 
mother, as guardian of the child, had the right under state law to act on behalf of the 
child, where to do so was in the child’s best interest.76  Therefore, in order to fulfill her
responsibilities as guardian the mother could consent for the child under Title I if she had 
“a good faith basis that is objectively reasonable for believing that it is necessary to 
consent on behalf of her minor children to the taping of the phone conversations…."77
Most federal and state courts that have considered the issue have applied a version 
of the vicarious consent doctrine in parental eavesdropping cases.78  The doctrine has 
been applied beyond parental eavesdropping on conversations between the other parent 
and their minor children.79
a.  Limitations on the Vicarious Consent Defense
The availability of the vicarious consent defense is fact specific.  The age of the 
minor and the purpose of the surveillance are factors that are taken into account by 
courts.  A leading case illustrating this is Pollock v. Pollock.80  Samuel Pollock (Samuel) 
75 See id. at 749
76 See Thompson v. Dulaney, 838 F. Supp. 1535 (D. Utah 1993).
77 See id. at 1543.
78 See id..; Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F. 3d 601 (6th Cir. 1998); Campbell v. Price, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1186 (E.D. 
Ark. 1998); Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (adopting the vicarious consent doctrine in 
interpreting state wiretap acts); State v. Diaz, 706 A.2d 264 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998) (adopting the 
vicarious consent doctrine in interpreting state wiretap acts); West Virginia Dep’t of Health and Human 
Res. v. David L., 453 S.E.2d 646 (W. Va. 1994) (interpreting both the state and federal wiretap acts to 
include the vicarious consent doctrine).  As of the writing of this article the only court to reject the 
vicarious consent doctrine was Williams v. Williams, 581 N.W.2d l777 (Mich. 1998) (interpreting both the 
Michigan and federal wiretap acts to not recognize vicarious consent in parental eavesdropping cases.
79 See Diaz, 706 A.2d at 516 (upholding the admissibility of the audio portion of a video tape in a criminal 
trial of babysitter for abuse of the child).
80
  154 F.3d 601(6th Cir. 1998).
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and his current wife Laura Pollock (Laura) brought a damage action under the Wiretap 
Act against Samuel’s former wife, Sandra Pollock (Sandra) and her two attorneys for tape 
recording and disclosing the contents of conversations between fourteen year old 
Courtney Pollock (Courtney) and Samuel and Laura.81  The recordings occurred on an 
extension phone in Sandra’s home while Courtney was residing with her.82  The district 
court entered summary judgment for the defendants.83  On appeal the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s adoption of the vicarious consent defense under Title I but 
remanded the case to determine whether Sandra’s purpose in taping the conversations 
was sufficient to preserve the consent defense.84  The record contained conflicting 
evidence as to whether her motive in taping was out of genuine concern for the best 
interest of the child.85  If Laura’s motivation in taping was to “gain access to Courtney’s 
attorney-client communications” or if in some other sense was not motivated by the best 
interest of the child, the defense of vicarious consent would not be available.86  Where 
evidence is disputed, motive presents a question of fact that is sufficient to overcome a 
motion for summary judgment.87
81 See id. at 603. (noting facts surrounding the appeal).   Sandra’s attorneys named as defendants were 
Oliver Barber and Luann Glidewell.  Id.
82 See id. at 604 (noting Sandra's admission to recording phone calls on an extension phone in her home).
83 See id. at 605 (noting entry of summary judgment by district court). 
84 See id. at 610, 613 (affirming adoption of exception and remanding case).
85 See id. at 612 (noting conflicting evidence surrounding Sandra's motivation).
86 See id. at 611 (noting presentation of evidence suggesting possibility of ulterior motives).
87 See Kroh v. Kroh, 567 S.E. 2d 760, 764 (N.C. App. 2002).
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b.  The Test for Parental Motive
As suggested by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Pollock, the parent’s 
motive in wiretapping or bugging a child’s conversation is crucial to the vicarious 
consent defense.  The test adopted by Pollock and other courts88 is whether the parent had 
a “good faith, objectively reasonable basis for believing such consent was necessary for 
the welfare of the child.”89    Alabama has adopted a stricter test.  Under this standard the 
parent must demonstrate a good faith, objectively reasonable belief "that the minor child 
is being abused, threatened, or intimidated by the other parent.”90
 c.  Critique of the Vicarious Consent Rule
Given the reluctance of courts to sanction spousal eavesdropping under the 
Wiretap Act for the reasons stated above, it is surprising that the vicarious consent notion 
has been received favorably by court without critical examination.   Some of the 
problems created by recognition of a parent’s right to consent to eavesdropping on a 
child’s conversations with the other parent and third parties are: (1) the joint custody 
problem; (2) the non-identity of interests problem; and (3) the minimization problem.
The Joint Custody Problem
One of the assumptions of the vicarious consent principle is that there is authority 
to consent for the minor child under state law that is incorporated into the one party 
88 Pollock adopts the test first articulated in Thompson.
89 Pollock, 154 F. 3d at 610 (noting adoption of Thompson standard of vicarious consent).
90 See Silas v. Silas, 680 So. 2d 368, 371 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (stating standard adopted by Alabama).
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consent defense under state and federal wiretap acts.  But this assumption ignores the 
rudimentary features of the important development of joint custody that is recognized in 
most states.91  The traditional model of custody was to grant one parent, usually the 
mother, both legal custody and physical custody.  Legal custody entails the authority to 
make important decisions involving the upbringing of the child such as where to go to 
school and whether to be treated medically.  Physical custody entails decisions about 
where the child shall reside and physical care.  The traditional model of sole custody 
grants the custodial parent both legal (decisional) and physical custody.  Non-custodial 
parents were given visitation rights.  Joint custody was recognized initially by California 
in 1980.92    Joint custody changes the division of responsibility under the traditional sole 
custody rule.  With joint custody one parent generally has physical custody but both 
parents share the responsibility for legal custody – making important decisions involving 
the upbringing of the child.  One commentator suggests that in joint custody 
arrangements, “the child’s care, education, religion, medical treatment and general 
welfare”93 be shared by both parents.   If this form of joint custody under state law 
applies to the parents in a vicarious consent eavesdropping case than the notion that the 
state law gives one parent the sole authority to consent to the invasion of privacy of the 
minor child and the other parent makes no sense.  If vicarious consent is shared by both 
parents under state law then that  state law is no warrant for the authority of one party to 
consent for the child under state or federal wiretap acts.  If the authority to wiretap is 
91 See D. Kelly Weisberg, Susan Frelich Appleton, Modern Family Law, note 1,844 (Aspen 2002).
92
  Some commentators suggest that the father’s rights movement was an important influence in the 
development of joint custody.
93 See, Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States, Sec. 19.5, p. 816, note 18.
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shared, then vicarious consent to wiretap the conversation of  a non physical custodial 
parent   would only be warranted in the unlikely case where that  parent agrees to it.
There is virtually no discussion of the impact of the multiple kinds of joint 
custody arrangements under state law on vicarious consent to wiretapping under wiretap 
acts.  In Wright v. David L.94 a court of appeals court in West Virginia suggests that the 
vicarious consent doctrine is limited to the  physical custodial parent.  David was 
separated from his wife, Lisa, who was given temporary custody of their twin daughters, 
Chelsea and Ashley, ages 6, and their son, Joshua, age 5. Lisa lived with the children in 
the marital home.  Prior to their divorce David asked his mother to place a voice activated 
tape recorder in the children’s bedroom while she babysat for them.
After listening to these taped conversations, David gave the tapes to his lawyer.  
The tapes were played to a therapist for Family Services for the West Virginia HHS and 
thereafter David was given physical custody of the children.  In reviewing whether the 
tape recordings were legal  West Virginia law, the court assumed that the vicarious 
consent principle applied to the state eavesdropping statute but held that vicarious 
consent could not be exercised by a parent in respect to conversations taking place in the 
home of the parent with physical custody over the child.  Therefore, the recording 
violated the Wiretap Act and were not admissible in the custody proceedings.
It seems odd to vest exclusive authority to the physical custodial parent to decide 
whether to invade the privacy of the minor child and the non-physical custodial parent 
when the non-physical parent has joint decisional authority to consent for the minor.  In 
Wright the physical custodial parent had consented to physical access to the children by 
the paternal grandparent and her exclusive authority to decide physical access is 
94
 453 S.E. 2d  646 (W. Va. 1994)
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preserved.  Perhaps the Wright decision is palatable if the conversation with the child is 
viewed as a form of physical custody - access to the child.  But that is not a sensible 
interpretation of physical custody in a case like Wright.  The non physical custodial 
parent had the right to converse over the telephone in Wright and therefore Lisa Wright’s 
physical custody authority did not extend to physical assess to the children through 
conversing over the telephone with the other parent.  There might be a good argument for 
viewing taping of a child’s conversation with a parent as part of  the authority of a 
physical custodial parent in the rare and exceptional cases  where the non physical 
custodial parent has been restrained by a court order from conversing over the telephone 
with a child.    But in that case the authority to wiretap ought to be pursuant to a court 
authorization to determine whether the order not to converse with the minor has been 
violated.   The conceptual incomprehensibleness of the vicarious consent principle in 
cases where the parents have joint decisional custody ought to by itself be enough for 
courts to reject the vicarious consent principle.  But there are additional problems that 
also ought to move courts in that direction.
The Non-Identity of Interest Problem
Even in a perfect family world and life the substituted judgment by a parent for 
the decision of a child may not be identical to the best interests of the child.  As Gerald P. 
Koocher has noted:
The concept of substituted judgment [in which an adult provides a kind of 
proxy consent] presumes a great deal.  Most notably, it assumes that the 
person making the decision is willing and able to act in this capacity on 
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the child’s best interest (i.e., without a conflict of interest).  Even within 
the loving, intact, two-parent family, no all parental decisions regarding 
children are without conflicts of interest.  Parents often subordinate their 
needs and preferences to the best interest of their children (or to what they 
believe to be their children’s best interests), but this is not always the 
case.95
David J. Anderman further observed in a 1993 article:
In the majority of parental wiretap cases reported, however, the family 
unit has fallen apart or seems to be deteriorating.  Indeed, in only one of 
the cases involving parental wiretapping were the parents of the c hild not 
divorced or seeking a divorce.  The interceptions were not effected for the 
interests of the child, but to give the parent leverage in the settlement of 
custody battles.96
The risk of a parent’s substituted judgment for a child is not in the best interest of 
the child is exacerbated in cases where the family is conflicted by a separation, divorce 
and custody fight.  In such cases there is a greater likelihood of a non-identity of interest 
between the parent’s choice and the child’s best interest.  A decision of a parent in a 
marital or custodial dispute to wiretap or bug the conversations of a child with the other 
parent is rife with the risk of non-identity of interest – that the eavesdropping parent is 
95 See Gerald O. Koocher, Children Under Law:  The Paradigm of Consent in Reforming the Law, 3, 14 
(Gary B. Melton ed. (1987).
96
 David J. Anderson, Title III At A Crossroads:  The Ordinary Course of Business in the Home, The 
Consent of Children, and Parental Wiretapping 141 U. Penn. L. Rev. 2261, 2290 (1993).
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motivated by personal interest or hostile motive against the other parent and not the best 
interests of the child.
Is the increased risk of non-identity of intrests in parental electronic surveillance 
cases adequately accounted for, or protected against, in courts adoption of the substituted 
consent doctrine?  Given the limitations of the self minimization rule of vicarious consent 
I do not think the increased risks of non-identity of interests are accounted for. 
d.  The Minimization Problem
A wiretap on a telephone line records the conversations of all of the parties that 
are talking.  Even if there is justification for recording conversations between targeted 
parties, the pervasive nature of a wiretap is such that the privacy of parties for whom 
there is no justification is invaded.  Recording portions of some of the conversation 
between targeted parties may not be justified because they are not relevant to the 
legitimate purposes of the eavesdropping.  The privacy invasiveness of a wiretap led 
Justice Douglas to describe a wiretap as:
[A] dragnet, sweeping in all conversations within its scope – without 
regard to the participants or the nature of the conversations.  It intrudes 
upon the privacy of those not even suspected of crime and intercepts the 
most intimate conversations.97
Court ordered wiretaps under Title I impose an obligation on the government to  
minimize the interception of conversations that are not evidence of criminal conduct.98
One of the problems with exceptions to Title I in private surveillance cases is the absence 
of any court reviewed efforts to minimize the overreach of the wiretap or bugging.  
97 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64-65 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
98 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(5) (West 2000).
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Self-Minimization Under the Vicarious Consent Doctrine
The courts that recognize a vicarious consent defense to Title I in parental 
eavesdropping cases contemplate self-minimization by the parents and/or their lawyer if 
the lawyer has advised them of the legality of wiretapping or bugging a child’s 
conversations.  The self-minimization obligation is implicit in the limitation of the 
vicarious consent authority to eavesdropping where the parent is properly motivated.  
Under either the strict or looser sense of proper motivation that is discussed above, it 
would not be legal for a parent to wiretap or bug conversations between their child and a 
third person if the purpose was simply to gather evidence for prospective or pending 
custody or divorce litigation.  The proper motive requirement constitutes a threshold 
minimization obligation:  to demonstrate some reasonable belief that the surveillance is in 
the best interest of the child.  A parent is not authorized to wiretap or bug conversations 
to gather evidence that would justify the surveillance.  For the surveillance to be legal 
under the vicarious consent doctrine evidence that would justify the surveillance must be 
acquired before the surveillance itself.99
Whether additional self-minimization requirements are imposed under the 
vicarious consent doctrine is not as clear.  Are lawyers or parents required to delete 
conversations that are clearly not relevant conversations?  
One problem is with the use of voice activated recording devices.  If such a device 
is placed on a phone or placed in a bug in the room all of the conversations in the room or 
over the telephone are recorded.  A less inherently pervasive use of technology would be 
for the eavesdropping parent to only trigger the recording when he or she knows the 
99 See Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1998).
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minor is talking to the other parent on the telephone.  This might be unacceptable because 
it would limit the recording to only when the parent is at home.  One might suggest a 
minimization requirement analogous to the Wiretap Act which would require the 
recording parent to delete conversations that are not relevant to the best interests of the 
child.  But the obvious problem with this requirement is the credibility of the resulting 
tape in the face that it has been tampered with.
I have been doing two things in this discussion of the various consent principal –
providing my best interpretation of the scope and requirements of the rule and offering a 
critique of the rule.  As for the critique, it is my view that problems I have discussed 
above are too considerable to support the vicarious consent principle.  I think it ought to 
be junked in those jurisdictions that have adopted it and not recognized by adoption by 
courts that in the future are faced with the question.
F.  Silent Video Surveillance
Video surveillance without an accompanying audio component is not a violation 
of Title I of the ECPA.100   The acquisition of an image is not an interception of a wire or 
oral communication because the contents of a conversation are not acquired.  Video 
surveillance is not the interception of an electronic communication under Title I of the 
ECPA because there has been no interception of the image while it is being transmitted.  
The audio portion of a videotape is an oral communication and would be subject to the 
100
  This is the view of all of the federal circuits that have considered the question.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885-86 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1994).
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rules discussed above for interspousal or parental bugging.101  This is also the emerging 
view in cases arising under state wiretap statutes.102
G. The Role of State Law
The question of whether it is legal for a spouse to record the conversations of 
another spouse in the family home under state wiretap statutes is more complicated.  
First, the Wiretap and Stored Communications Acts adopt a floor preemption rule 
allowing state wiretap and stored communications acts to provide for greater security for 
conversational privacy and for access to e-mail and voicemail (stored electronic 
communications).103  Therefore, state law may be written or construed to not provide for 
a marital conflict exception without violating the Federal Wiretap Act.  Second, in civil 
actions  brought for violations of the state statute the tort interspousal immunity defense 
may be available to the wiretapper.
1.  Interspousal Exceptions Under State Law
There are only a few state courts that have examined the question of whether the 
applicable state wiretap statute contains an exception for interspousal wiretapping.  Most 
of the courts that have addressed the question have construed states laws not to contain an 
101 See supra notes 47-87 and accompanying text. 
102 See State v. Diaz, 706 A.2d 264, 268 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1998); Ricks v. Maryland, 537 A.2d 612, 
616 (Md. 1988); People v. Teicher, 422 N.E. 2d 506, 513 (N.Y. 1981).
103 See State v. Ayres, 383 A. 2d 87 ( N.H. 1978) where the New Hampshire Supreme Court discusses the 
stricter consent rule under the state of New Hampshire’s wiretap act, New Hampshire RSA ch. 570-A.
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interspousal wiretapping exception.104   It should be noted that state courts within the two 
federal circuits that recognize the interspousal wiretapping exception under federal law 
are not bound by interpretations of federal law in interpreting state wiretap acts even if 
the state statute tracks the language of the Wiretap Act.  In Ranson v. Ranson,105 the 
Supreme Court of Georgia rejected the intercepting spouse’s contention that the state 
wiretap statute should be construed to recognize an interspousal wiretap exception as the 
Fifth Circuit had done in Simpson.106  In rejecting this contention the court relied on the 
state statute’s purpose to protect every citizen’s privacy and on the fact that the language 
of the statute did not contain an exception for interspousal wiretapping.107  New York 
also does not recognize an interspousal exception under the New York Wiretap Act.108
2. The State Interspousal Tort Immunity Defense
Interspousal tort immunity could provide a defense to civil suits for violation of 
state wiretap acts in cases where the state statute was not construed to contain an 
interspousal exception.  The statute would be violated but the general common law 
defense of interspousal immunity might be a defense in the damage action under the 
statute.
104 See generally, Stacey L. Mills, Note, He Wouldn’t Listen to Me Before, But Now…: Interspousal 
Wiretapping and An Analysis of State Wiretapping Statutes, 37 BRANDEIS L.J. 415, 421 (Spring, 1998).
105
  324 S.E. 2d 437 (Ga. 1985).
106 See id. at 438 (disagreeing with Fifth Circuits holding). 
107 See id. at 439 (noting state legislatures intention behind enactment of wiretap statute).
108 See Pica v. Pica, 417 N.Y.S.2d 528 (1979).
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Courts in states that still recognize interspousal tort immunity have generally not 
applied the doctrine to actions brought by spouses for violation of the state wiretap act.  
In Burgess v. Burgess,109 the Supreme Court of Florida reversed the court below and held 
that the legislature created an exception to the interspousal tort immunity defense in 
wiretap cases because the result of the defense – to admit the tape into evidence – would 
be contrary to marital harmony, the often cited purpose of the immunity defense.110   The 
Delaware Superior Court came to the same conclusion in interpreting Delaware law in 
State v. Jock.111
H. Interspousal and Parental Access to E-Mail:
Title I of the ECPA Off the Table
There are only a few appellate court decisions interpreting the legality of 
interspousal or parental access to e-mail and voicemail.  E-mail and voicemail cases in 
other contexts, however, provide a useful basis for evaluation of domestic conflict cases.  
Access to e-mail and voicemail by private parties is primarily regulated under Title II of 
the ECPA. 112  Title II regulates access to “stored electronic communications.”113
Communications such as e-mail that consist of purely electronic data are electronic 
109
  447 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 1984).
110 See id. at 222-23 (noting that policy behind interspousal immunity is not furthered through its 
application to wiretap litigation).
111
  404 A.2d 518 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1979).
112
  Regulations of government access to e-mail and voicemail, unlike access by a private party, may be 
subject to constitutional restraints  under the Fourth Amendment.  See, e.g., Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 
64 (2d Cir. 2001); United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406 (1996).
113 See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2701-2711.
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communications.  Under the recently enacted USA PATRIOT ACT (Patriot Act) 
amendments to the ECPA, voicemail is now treated in the same manner as e-mail.114
It is pretty well established under federal court precedent that once e-mail is 
received and stored in a computer system it is regulated exclusively under Title II.115  Or 
to put it another way, these cases hold that accessing stored e- mail is not an 
“interception” of an electronic communication under Title I.  The amendment to the 
Patriot Act would apply the same rule to voicemail. 
          Although the Supreme Court has not decided this question, the decisions of the two 
federal circuit courts that have indicate that once e-mail is stored is exclusively regulated 
by Title II.116  The Fifth Circuit initially construed the ECPA to restrict interception under 
Title I to the contemporary acquisition of the contents of a conversation or 
communication in 1994 in Steve Jackson Games v. United States Secret Service.117 This 
construction of Title I was initially rejected by the Ninth Circuit in Konop v. Hawaiian 
Airlines118 in 2001.  The Konop court held that e-mail could be intercepted after it was 
received.119  Furthermore, the court held that the accessing and downloading of  an e-mail 
could constitute a violation of both Title I and Title II.120 In a 2002 re-issue of it previous 
114
 See § 209 of the Patriot Act.  For a general analysis of the implications of the Patriot Act voicemail 
amendment to the ECPA see TURKINGTON AND ALLEN, supra note 3, at 342-345.
115
  The Supreme Court has not decided this question.  But the two federal circuit courts that have hold that 
once e-mail is stored it is exclusively regulated by Title II.  See Steve Jackson Games v. United States 
Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 262 F.3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001).
116 See Steve Jackson Games, 36 F. 3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); Konop, 262 F. 3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001).
117
  36 F. 3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994). 
118
  262 F. 3d 972 (9th Cir. 2001).
119 See id.
120 See id.
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decision, the Ninth Circuit changed its view and concurred with the Fifth Circuit’s 
Jackson Games view on the scope of the ECPA’s protection for  e-mail.121 The Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits' narrow construction of the scope of protection of e-mail has been severely 
criticized in commentary and is by no means a compelling or rational interpretation of the 
ECPA.  Nevertheless, the absence of a contrary federal circuit court construction of the 
federal statute has resulted in the creation of e-mail policies in the private sector that have 
relied upon this view of e-mail protection under federal law.  122  In the absence of 
Supreme Court  precedent, which is unlikely, the current high view adopted by the Fifth 
and Ninth Circuits that e-mail that has been received is exclusively subject to regulation 
under Title II of the ECPA is controlling.  The net effect of this precedent is that spousal 
access to stored e-mail is regulated by federal and state stored communications acts.
I.  Title II, The Stored Communications Act : Downloading E-mail from Computers 
Located in the Home
In a case where a spouse or parent accesses e-mail  from a computer in the home 
Title II may be violated.  Section 2701(a) prohibits the intentional accessing and 
obtaining of e-mail or voicemail (electronic communications) without authorization while 
it is in electronic storage.123
121 See id.
122 See TURKINGTON & ALLEN, supra note 3, at 335-39.
123
  18 U.S.C.A. § 2701 (West 2000). Section 2701(a) also prohibits the alteration of e-mail or voicemail 
(electronic communications) and acts which prevent authorized access to e-mail or voicemail.  For the e-
mail or voicemail to come within section 2701 it must be in a facility through which an electronic 
communications service is provided.  See id.
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1. Separate E-Mail Accounts and Separate Passwords
Efforts by spouses to segregate e-mail accounts and maintain separate private
passwords are important in evaluating whether access to e-mail stored on the hard drive 
of a family computer is “without authorization” within the meaning of Title II. 
Do spouses with joint access to the hard drive of a mutually used computer located in the 
home have authority to access the password protected e-mail files of the other spouse?
The answer most certainly is no if they have not shared their passwords.  Authorized 
access to the hard drive does not imply authority to access files that are password 
protected when the password has been withheld.  By  maintaining a separate password 
the spouse has affirmatively intended to exclude the other spouse from the personal e-
mail file.  As yet there have been no reported cases under federal or state stored
communications acts, but a Fourth Circuit cases on analogous facts persuasively rejects 
the contention of implied authority because of mutual access to the hard drive of a 
computer in the home,
In Trulock III v. J. Freeh,124 the court held that authority to generally access the 
computer hard drive did not include the authority to access password protected files of a 
joint computer user.  Linda Conrad  and Notra Trulock jointly used the same computer in 
an apartment they shared.  They protected their personal files with passwords.  Conrad 
consented to government access to Trulock’s protected password files.  In rejecting the 
governments contention that Trulock could consent to the Fourth Amendment Search of 
Conrad’s files the court concluded:
By using a password, Trulock affirmatively intended to exclude Conrad 
and others from his personal files.  Moreover, because he concealed his 
124
 275 F.3d  391 ( 4th Cir. 2001)(noting that password-protected computer files were accessed by an FBI 
computer specialist).
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password from Conrad, it cannot be said that Trulock assumed the risk 
that Conrad would permit others to search his files.  Thus Trulock had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the password-protected computer 
files and Conrad’s authority to consent to search did not extend to them.125
2. The “In Electronic Storage" Requirement of Title II
      The requirement that the e-mail or voicemail be in electronic storage may eliminate 
Title II from applicability in many domestic conflict cases where the e-mail is in the hard 
drive of the computer in the family home.  As noted above only e-mail that is in 
“electronic storage” is protected from unauthorized access under section 2701 of Title II .  
Electronic storage is defined in the ECPA as “temporary, immediate storage incidental to 
the electronic transmission” or “backup” storage of an electronic communication.126  In 
Fraser v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,127  Judge Brody took judicial notice of the 
technology of e-mail transmission that has been invoked favorably by other courts:
Transmission of e-mail from the sender to the recipient through an 
electronic communication … is indirect.  First an individual authorized to 
use the system logs on the system to send a message.  After a message is 
sent, the system stores the message in temporary or intermediate storage.  I 
will refer to this storage as “intermediate storage.”  After a message is 
sent, the system also stores a copy of the message in a separate storage for 
backup protection, in the event that the system crashes before transmission 
is completed.  I will refer to this storage as “backup protection storage.”  
In the course of transmission from the sender to the recipient, a message 
passes through both intermediate and backup protection storage.  
Transmission is completed when the recipient, logs on to the system and 
retrieves the message from intermediate storage.  After the message is 
retrieved by the intended recipient, the message is copied to a third type of 
125
 Trulock brought a Bivens action against former FBI Director Louis Freeh and others for violation of his 
Fourth Amendment rights.  The Fourth Circuit held that Freeh enjoyed qualified immunity for the illegal 
search because the contours of Fourth Amendment computer consent law had not been established at the 
time of the illegal search of Turlock’s files.
126 See 18 U.S.C.A § 2510(17) (West 2000).
127
 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D Pa. 2001).
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storage, which I will call “post-transmission storage.”  A message may 
remain in post-transmission storage for several years.128
The court in Fraser went on to hold that access to e-mail was not subject to Title II 
regulation because “post-transmission storage” is not “in electronic storage.”129
3.  White v. White130
Title II of the ECPA prohibits unauthorized access to an electronic 
communication (e-mail) while it is in “electronic storage.”131   Wiretap statutes in states 
like New Jersey contain language that tracks the Federal Stored Communications Act.132
In White v. White133 the court evaluated the applicability of state and federal statutes to 
interspousal access to e-mail stored on a computer in the family home.134  The case 
illustrates issues that face lawyers in such cases.  In White, although separated, the 
husband and wife lived in the same house.135  The husband occupied the “sun room” of 
the home where the family computer, television and stereo were located.136  The sun 
room was also the only way to get to the grill on the deck of the house.137  As a result, all 
128 Id.  at 633-34 (citations omitted).
129
  See id. at 636 (noting inapplicability of Title II).
130
 781 A.2d 85 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 2001).
131 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2701(a)(2) (West 2000).
132 See N.J.S.A. 2A: 156A-27(a) (West 2000).
133 See White v. White, 781 A. 2d 85 (2001). 
134 See id. at 214-15 (noting issue before the court).
135 See id. at 215.
136 See id.
137 See id.
39
of the members of the family were in and out of the room.138  After the wife discovered a 
letter from the husband to his girlfriend, allegedly in plain view, she hired a computer 
detective and without using the husband’s password copied his e-mails that were stored 
on the hard drive.139  The court held there was no violation of the New Jersey Wiretap 
Act for two reasons.140  First, the e-mail was not in “electronic storage” when it was 
accessed.141  Second, access to the e-mail was not “without authorization” as meant by 
the Act.142
a.  E-Mail Was Not In “Electronic Storage”
In White the court adopted the accepted technical description of transmission of e-
mail.143  E-mail typically involves three stages of storage, intermediate, backup and 
protected storage and post transmission storage.144  Once e-mail has been retrieved by the 
recipient and stored, it is in the “post transmission storage" stage.145  Post-transmission 
138 See id. at 223. 
139 See id. at 215.  When installing the America Online (AOL) software the program automatically created 
the Personal Filing Cabinet (“PTC”) on the hard drive of the family computer.  The PTC automatically 
saved e-mail but the e-mail was not automatically password protected and could be accessed by simply 
opening up the AOL files on the hard drive.  The e-mail could have easily been protected by a password or 
by deletion. But the husband did not know the e-mail was saved on the hard drive and took no steps to 
protect them.  See id. at 216.
140 See id. at 220-21. 
141 See id. at 221.
142 See id.
143 See id. at 219. 
144 See id.
145 See id.
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storage was not “electronic storage” within the meaning of the Wiretap Act.146  The 
Wiretap Act protected only electronic communications which are “in the course of 
transmission or are backup to that course of transmission.”147  This construction of 
federal and state stored communications acts take wiretap statutes off the table in cases 
where spouses access e-mail stored on the hard drive of a computer in the family home.
b.  Unauthorized Use
In White the court also concluded that access of the e-mail was not “without 
authorization" as that concept is meant under the Act.148 Without authorization was 
limited to prohibited use of a computer or unauthorized use of someone’s password.  
Because the husband in White had consented to his wife’s access to the computer 
network, her “roaming in and out of different directories on the hard drive” was not 
“without authorization.”149
J.  The Interspousal Exception
New Jersey was one of a majority of states that had construed their state wiretap 
statute to not contain an exception for interspousal wiretapping.  The court in White took 
the same position on the stored electronic communications portion of the Act.150
146 See id. at 220.
147 See id.   The court relied heavily on Fraser v .Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001) (construing Title II of the ECPA).
148 See id. at 221. 
149 See id.
150 See id.
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Although the court did not have to discuss the question it held that the New Jersey 
Wiretap Act did not impliedly exempt interspousal accessing of e-mail in the computer of 
the home.151
K. The Privacy Intrusion Tort
Most states have recognized a tort right to privacy under state common law.  The 
seminal call for recognition of privacy rights was made in a famous article published in 
the Harvard Law Review in 1890 authored by Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. 
Brandeis.152  In the article the authors focused on tort liability for media publicity of the 
private lives of public figures.153  The current formulation of the common law of privacy 
was greatly influenced by an article written by the late Dean William Prosser in the 
California Law Review in 1960.154  In that article Prosser argued that four torts had 
emerged from the large body of common law precedent.155  Prosser argued that although 
the torts were referred to as involving invasions of privacy they really involved different 
kinds of torts and different invasions.156  The four-part interest analysis and disparate tort 
theory that Prosser advocated was adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(Restatement) in section 652.157  The Restatement has been influential and is generally 
151 See id. at 217-18 (noting state legislature considered and then rejected interspousal immunity under the 
New Jersey Wiretap Act). 
152 See Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)
153 See id.
154
 See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
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embraced by courts as an initial premise in analysis of privacy tort claims.158  The four 
torts recognized in the Restatement are: (1) Intrusion (652B); (2) Appropriation (652C);  
(3) Private Facts (652D); and (4) False Light (652E).159  Of these, the privacy intrusion 
tort is the most relevant to electronic surveillance in domestic or custody disputes.  This 
tort focuses on invasions of informational or physical privacy through the acquisition of 
personal information about a person or through physical invasions of a person’s space or 
body.
The common law privacy intrusion tort is violated if someone intentionally 
intrudes upon the private affairs, seclusion or solitude of another person by means that 
would be highly offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities.160  Recently, the Supreme 
Court of California has articulated an important formulation of the intrusion element of 
the tort.161  The intrusion element is established if the plaintiff demonstrates that the 
defendant has penetrated some “zone of physical or sensory privacy surrounding, or 
obtained unwanted access to data about, the plaintiff…if the plaintiff had an objectively 
reasonable expectation of seclusion or solitude in the place, conversation or data 
source.”162  Core examples of privacy intrusions provided by the Restatement include:  
(1) forced entry into a hotel room or home; (2) looking into someone’s bedroom with 
158 See Jay M. Feinman, Doctrinal Classification and Economic Negligence, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 137, 
141 (1996) (noting widespread adoption of Restatement).
159 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
160
  Most states adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts version of the Privacy Intrusion Tort.  See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
161 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P. 2d 469, (Cal. 1998).
162 See id. at 490 (noting requirements for a cause of action for intrusion). 
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binoculars; (3) opening private personal mail; (4) searching a safe, wallet or private bank 
account and tapping telephone lines.163
It is well established that an invasion of privacy for intrusion does not require that 
information or images that are the object of the intrusion be published or used in any 
way.  The tort is established by the acquisition of information or the invasion of 
someone’s physical space.164  A leading case illustrating this last point is Hamberger v. 
Eastman.165    The New Hampshire Supreme Court found a privacy intrusion violation 
when the defendant surreptitiously placed an audio tape recorder in the plaintiff’s 
bedroom.166  The court found the conduct actionable even though there was no allegation 
that anyone had listened to the tape:
If the peeping Tom, the big ear and the electronic eavesdropper (whether 
ingenious or ingenuous) have a place in the hierarchy of social values, it 
ought not to be at the expense of a married couple minding their own 
business in the seclusion of their bedroom who have never asked for or by 
their conduct deserved a potential projection of their private conversations 
and actions to their landlord or to others.  Whether actual or potential such 
“publicity with respect to private matters of purely personal concern in an 
injury to personality.  It impairs the mental peace and comfort of the 
individual and may produce suffering more acute than that produced by a 
mere bodily injury."167
The view that the intrusion itself is a sufficient affront to personal dignity to be 
actionable is also reflected in the damage requirement for privacy intrusion tort actions.  
163 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B, cmt. 20(a) (1977).
164 See id.
165
  206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
166 See id. at 242 (holding defendant liable for privacy intrusion).
167 Id. (quoting POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 58 (1959)).
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Credible evidence of emotional distress is sufficient in privacy tort actions.168  Expert 
testimony is not required for the issue of damages to go to the jury.169   Section 652H of 
the Restatement supports this view:
One who has established a cause of action for invasion of his privacy is 
entitled to recover damages for:
(a) the harm to his interesting privacy resulting from the 
invasion;
(b) his mental distress proved to have been suffered if it is of a 
kind that normally results from such an invasion; and
(c) special damages of which the invasion is a legal cause.170
Some defendants have argued that the privacy intrusion tort ought to require a 
showing of extreme or heightened emotional distress analogous to that required in an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress (tort of outrage) case.  The best reading of the 
above authority and the Restatement  is that the privacy intrusion tort does not require 
such a showing and differs from the tort of outrage in two important respects.171  First, 
the tort of outrage requires a threshold demonstration of conduct by the defendant that is 
extreme and outrageous in the sense that the conduct is beyond that which is tolerated in 
a civilized society.172  In a privacy intrusion tort action the intrusion must be substantial 
168 See Monroe v. Darr, 559 P.2d 322, 327 (Kan. 1977) (noting that scant amount of evidence was enough 
to send question to jury); D. ELDER, THE LAW OF PRIVACY, § 2:10 at 57-61 (1991). Trevino v. 
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. , 582 S.W. 2d 582, 584 (Tex. App. 1979) (noting that because of the nature of 
the tort at issue, physical damages are unnecessary).
169 See Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A. 2d 396, 401 (N.H. 1999) (citing Monroe v. Darr, 559 P.2d 322, 327 
(Kan. 1977)).
170 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652h (1977).
171 See Miller v. Brooks, 472 S.E.2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (distinguishing elements required for cause 
of action under tort of outrage and privacy intrusion tort).
172
 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46. cmt. d (1976).
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in the sense that the means are highly offensive to an ordinary person.  The privacy 
invading conduct must violate community standards of decency in an intrusion action but 
it need not reach the level of social condemnation that is required for intentional infliction 
of emotional distress.  Second, and most importantly, the quantum of evidence of 
emotional distress that is required for the case to go to the jury is much less in an 
intrusion action.  Credible evidence of emotional distress resulting from the intrusion is 
sufficient for the jury to consider compensatory damages in an intrusion action.  This 
may be demonstrated without expert testimony.173  The threshold quantum of evidence in 
a tort of outrage action is greater and requires demonstration of a “severe and disabling 
emotional or mental condition” generally recognized by professionals trained to do so.174
The interrelationship between the wiretap acts and the common law privacy 
intrusion tort in family and custodial dispute electronic surveillance cases is illustrated by 
a recent Supreme Court of New Hampshire case.  In Fischer v. Hooper,175 a divorced 
husband taped the conversations of his former wife and daughter without obtaining either
party's consent.176  Upon discovering this, the wife brought a cause of action under the 
state wiretap act and for invasion of privacy under the state common law.177  The court 
remanded the case for further findings of fact on the state wiretap count but affirmed the 
173 See Fischer, 732 A. 2d at 401 (noting expert testimony not required).
174 See Waddle v. Sparks, 414 S.E.2d  22, 27 (N.C. 1992) (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics & 
Gynecology Ass'n, 395 S.E.2d 85, 97 (1990)).  (Need more authority.)
175
  732 A. 2d 396 (N.H. 1999). 
176 See id. at 398
177 See id.
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lower court’s decision that the plaintiff’s privacy intrusion tort action was properly 
submitted to the jury.178
In Fischer the parties had joint custody of their daughter and a guardian ad litem
and a therapist were appointed for their daughter.179  The husband argued that the wife 
had no reasonable expectation of privacy of her conversations with her daughter because 
she should have expected that the daughter would divulge the content of their 
conversations to the therapist.180  Even if this was the case, the court concluded that the 
jury might have concluded that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy that 
her actual voice and words would not be “captured on tape.”181
Fischer assumes as a basis of its intrusion tort holding that wiretap legislation and 
common law privacy tort claims exist as separate legal claims even though the 
misconduct that is the basis of the wiretap and privacy intrusion tort actions is the same.  
In the absence of a clear intention that the wiretap act was intended to preempt the state 
common law electronic surveillance that constitutes an intrusion ought to be actionable 
even though it might also be a violation of wiretap legislation. Given this view that state 
wiretap and privacy intrusion tort claims exist as separate claims, conduct that did not 
178 See id. at 398, 402  (noting holding of court with respect to privacy and state wiretap claims).
179 See id. at 398 (noting status of custody).
180 See id.  400 (noting contentions of defendant regarding plaintiff's alleged diminished expectation of 
privacy).
181 See id. at 401 (stating court's rationale).
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violate the wiretap act might constitute a violation of the privacy intrusion tort.  This is 
the view of the Supreme Court of California.182
1. Invasions of Privacy and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
As noted above, privacy intrusion and intentional infliction of emotional distress 
actions do not track each other.  However, in some marital conflict cases electronic 
surveillance can be sufficiently outrageous to constitute both torts.  A North Carolina 
appeals court in Miller v. Brooks183 found this to be the case.  In Miller the wife, Annette 
Miller, hired a private detective to install a hidden video camera in the bedroom ceiling of 
the home after she was separated and agreed not to return to her former marital home.184
She also represented herself as a resident of the home and intercepted some of her 
estranged husband’s mail.185  Terry Miller, the husband, sued his estranged wife and the 
detectives she had hired for privacy intrusion, intentional infliction of emotional distress 
and trespass to real property.186  The trial court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants in respect to all of plaintiff’s claims.187  The court of appeals reversed holding 
that plaintiff had presented evidence on all claims that was sufficient to go to a jury.188
182 See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc. 955 P.2d 469 (Cal. 1998) (holding that recordings of 
conversations at the scene of an automobile accident did not violate the California Wiretap Act but did 
constitute privacy intrusion tort under state law.
183
  472 S.E. 2d 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).
184 See id. at 352 (noting actions of defendants).
185 See id. at 353 (noting actions of defendant).
186 See id. 
187 See id.
188 See id. at 357 (stating disposition of case).
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Defendants contended that the husband had a reduced expectation of privacy 
because of his marriage to defendant Annette Miller.189  In rejecting this argument the 
court noted:
Although a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy might, in some 
cases, be less for married persons than for single persons, such is not the 
case here where the spouses were estranged and living separately.  
Further, the marital relationship has no bearing on the acts of [the private 
detectives].  Plaintiff’s marriage to defendant Miller did nothing to reduce 
his expectations that his personal privacy would not be invaded by perfect 
strangers.190
The video surveillance, opening of the mail and trespass into the plaintiff’s 
property also constituted sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct for the jury to 
consider emotional distress damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.191
The court also ruled that the plaintiff had established sufficient evidence of aggravated 
conduct for the jury to award punitive damages for both the privacy intrusion and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress torts.192
2.  Privacy Intrusion Tort and Silent Video Surveillance
In cases where federal or state wiretap and stored communications acts are not 
violated the common law privacy intrusion tort may apply to wiretapping, bugging, silent 
video surveillance, or electronic downloading of e-mail that are employed in domestic or 
custodial conflicts.  As noted in section F above silent video surveillance is not regulated 
under state and federal wiretap acts.  The common law privacy intrusion tort may apply 
189 See id.  at 354-355 (noting contention of defendants).
190 See id. at 355.
191 See id. at 356 (noting sufficiency of evidence for submission to jury).
192 See id. at 357 (reversing summary judgment on issue of damages).
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to silent video surveillance and other forms of electronic surveillance  that are employed 
in domestic or custodial conflicts that do not violate federal or state wiretap and stored 
electronic communications acts.  Nonetheless, as discussed below, while the the intrusion 
tort would provide a complimentary compensatory damage remedy, the invasion of 
privacy would not be a basis for excluding the fruits of the tortuous conduct in divorce or 
custody proceedings.193
A privacy intrusion tort action might be available in silent video recordings cases 
if the video captured images of someone in a private place where he or she had a 
reasonable expectation of privacy.194  As illustrated by the court in White v. White195,  the 
privacy intrusion tort gives courts flexibility through the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” and “highly offensive means” elements.196  This renders the particular 
circumstances of the wiretapping, bugging or silent video surveillance critical to the 
court's analysis.  In Alexander v. Pathfinder, Inc.197 for example, the court held that the 
audio taping of conversations between a mother and staff in a facility for the mentally 
retarded was not an intrusion upon the seclusion of the mother because she knew the 
conversations were being recorded and did not object.198 Moreover, in Deteresa v. 
193 See infra Section D.
194 See McCray v. State, 581 A. 2d 45, 48 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (holding that government video 
taping was not a search because a person walking on a public sidewalk or street has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in activities in public view).
195
 781 A. 2d 85 (2001).
196 See generally  id.
197
  189 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 1999).
198 See id. at 742-43 (noting fact that mother did not object to recording my institution's employees).
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American Broadcasting, Inc.199 the surreptitious audio and videotaping by a television 
producer of a woman who would not appear on his show was found not to be a violation 
of the privacy intrusion tort because the videotaping occurred in a public place.200  The 
audio taping was not sufficiently offensive to be actionable because she had spoken to a 
person she knew was a reporter.201  Compare these decisions with the Supreme Court of 
California’s view in Sanders v. ABC.202   In Sanders the court held that a telepsychic had 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in conversations with an agent of ABC held in a large 
room with rows of cubicles (about 100) in which psychics took their calls.203
There is general legal recognition that a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their conversations or conduct at their home.204  Surreptitious wiretapping, 
bugging or video surveillance in a person’s home clearly constitutes an intentional 
intrusion into the subject’s seclusion or private affairs.  Courts early on recognized 
surreptitious audio taping by a landlord in a tenant’s bedroom as an invasion of 
privacy.205  Moreover, the Restatement considers surreptitious video and audio 
surveillance to be a paradigm of intrusion into seclusion and private affairs.206
Surreptitious wiretapping, bugging and videotaping in domestic and custodial 
conflicts have generally been found to be actionable intrusions.  There is little inclination 
199
 121 F.3d 460 (9th Cir. 1997).
200 See id. at 466 (refusing to sustain cause of action where plaintiff was videotaped in public view).
201 See id. (noting that plaintiff knew the person was a reporter).
202
  978 P. 2d 67 (Cal. 1999).
203 See id.
204
  See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
205 See Hamberger v. Eastman, 206 A.2d 239 (N.H. 1964).
206 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (b) cmt. 2. (1977).
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on the part of courts that have considered the question to track wiretap act construction 
and recognize a marital conflict or vicarious consent defense in privacy intrusion tort 
actions.  The notion of vicarious consent is irrelevant in a privacy intrusion tort action.  
Consent is, of course, a defense to the tort action, but it is the consent of the party whose 
privacy in invaded that is relevant .  Even if the custodial parent could consent for the 
child, there could be no vicarious consent for the invasion of privacy for the non-
custodial  parent of other third parties.  There consent would be governed by general tort 
principles of actual consent, express or implied.  207
For example in Fischer the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that a custodial
parent’s taping of telephone conversations between his daughter and former wife to have 
constituted an intrusion. 208  Although the court had appointed a therapist for the 
daughter and the mother should have expected that the daughter would discuss her 
conversations with the therapist the mother retained a reasonable expectation that the 
conversation would not be electronically recorded.209   The court treated consent to be 
governed by general tort principles.210  Similarly the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
found that the placement of a hidden video camera in the home and bedroom of  an 
207 See RESTATEMENT  (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652; Deitman v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(holding no express or implied consent for surreptitious video taping of  office visit  because Dietman 
invited reporter claiming to be patient into office in Dietman’s home). 
208 Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A. 2d 396, 398 (N.H. 1999).
209 See id.
210 See id.  The court held the trial court had properly instructed the jury that whether the mother had 
impliedly consented to the surveillance depended upon whether her conduct in fact constituted implied 
consent and  that  trial court did not error in failing to include the term “acquiescence” in the instructions to 
the jury on consent.  See id.
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estranged husband by his wife was a highly offensive intrusion into his  private affairs 
and seclusion.211
3.  Interspousal Access to E-Mail and the Privacy Intrusion Tort
Employees seeking damages for violation of the privacy intrusion tort against 
employers who accessed their e-mail have generally been unsuccessful.  Courts have 
used the alternative grounds that the employee has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in e-mail stored in an business computer network and that employer access is not an 
offensive means within the privacy intrusion tort.  This has been the holding even if the 
employer published policy was that e-mail communications are confidential and not 
monitored.  A leading and controversial case is Smyth v. Pillsbury Company.212  There,  a 
federal district court held Smyth had no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail 
communications to a supervisor over an e-mail system that was “apparently utilized by 
the entire company.”213  The court also found accessing the particular communications 
was not a “highly offensive” invasion of privacy.214  A Texas court of appeals court took 
a similar view in McClaren v. Microsoft Corporation.215  A Superior Court in 
211 See Miller v. Brook, 472 S. E.2d 350, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996).  The defendant wife’s conduct also 
included opening the husband’s mail.  But I read the case to hold the video surveillance by itself was 
sufficient to constitute a privacy intrusion tort invasion.
212
 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
213
 See id. at 101 (holding Smyth did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy).
214 See id. (holding access to Smyth's e-mails was not "highly offensive").
215
  No. 97-00095-F, 1999 WL 339015 ( Tex. App. May 28, 1999) (holding access to employee e-mail by 
employee not highly offensive and employee did not have reasonable expectation of privacy).
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Massachusetts, however, has taken a different view and would recognize a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in employee e-mail.216
The correctness of decisions that fail to recognize that employees have reasonable 
expectations of privacy in privacy intrusion tort actions brought against employers for 
access to employee e-mail in company e-mail systems is beyond the scope of this article.  
But I think it is clear that these cases do not control the question of whether spousal 
access to e-mail stored in a computer in the family or marital home is a violation of the 
privacy intrusion tort.  As proprietors of company e-mail systems employers have 
authority to access employee e-mail under the Stored Communications Act.217 Even 
employees have reasonable expectations of privacy in e-mail stored outside of company 
e-mail systems.  In a leading case, United States v. Maxwell218 the court there held that a 
United States Air Force Colonel had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail 
messages stored in his internet service provider's central computer under a contractual 
privacy policy not to disclose the e-mail to anyone other than an authorized user or 
pursuant to a court order.219
The reasonableness of privacy expectations in e-mail stored in computers in the 
home will depend upon whether the spouse has consented or authorized access to the e-
mail by the other spouse.  If separate e-mail accounts and separate passwords are 
216
 See Restuccia vBurk Technology,.1996 WL1329386 ( Mass. Super. 1996) (NOT CORRECT)
217
 Section 2701(c) of Title II provides that it is not unlawful to access stored electronic communications if 
access is authorized  “by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic service.” 
218
 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
219 See id. at  417-19 (holding Colonel had an expectation of privacy).  The e-mail in question was 
generated by computer hardware, software and accessories that were purchased and maintained by 
Maxwell.  Use of the computer and services by Maxwell was not in connection with his official Air Force 
duties.
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maintained by spouses who jointly share a computer with joint access to the main drive 
each spouse would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their separate e-mail 
accounts.  As observed by the Trulock court in the discussion above, a spouse’s 
affirmative act of maintaining a separate e-mail account and password demonstrates an 
intention to exclude others ( including the  other spouse) from the personal e-mail files.  
By this act the spouse has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the password-protected 
files.220
White v. White,221 discussed above,  illustrates the importance of password –
protected e-mail files in privacy intrusion tort actions.  The court in  White rejected Mr. 
White’s  claim that accessing stored e-mail by Mrs. White constituted a violation of the 
privacy intrusion tort.  As correctly observed by the court, the plaintiff must have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the area or information that is accessed and the 
means of access must be “highly offensive” for a tortious invasion of privacy to occur.222
Both spouses and their children had authority to access the hard drive of the computer 
which was located in the sun room of the home.  Under the e-mail service agreement with 
AOL, and unknown to Mr. White, he was saving e-mail he sent and received on the hard 
drive of the computer.  Because he did not know he was doing this he did not delete or 
protect the e-mail with a password.  In light of the authority given to both spouses to 
access the hard drive Mr. White had no reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mail on the 
hard drive of the computer.  The court analogized the computer to an office file cabinet in 
220 See Trulock III v. J. Freeh, 275 F.3d  391, 403 ( 4th Cir. 2001); see also text accompanying notes 114, 
115.  
221
 781 A. 2d  85 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2001)
222
 .  Id  at 91-92.
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a room both spouses had complete access to.223 The privacy intrusion tort becomes 
important in spousal access to e-mail cases because as discussed in  the section above 
several courts have construed the Stored Communications Act as not applying to e-mail 
stored in computers in the home224  But as noted in the section below violations of the 
privacy intrusion tort will provide a damage remedy for the spouse whose privacy is 
invaded but the tort violation is not an independent basis for excluding the illegally 
acquired e-mail from divorce or custody proceedings.225
III. EXCLUSION OF FRUITS OF ILLEGAL SURVEILLANCE
A. The Fault Requirement for Violations of the ECPA
Criminal responsibility, damage remedies and the exclusionary rule are only 
triggered if there is a willful or intentional violation of the ECPA. Section 2511 of the 
1968 Wiretap Act limited criminal sanctions to “willful” violations of the statute.226
Although initially there was no reference to “willful” in the damage section of the statute 
– section 2520 – courts generally required a finding that the defendant had acted willfully 
for damages to be recoverable.  227   “Willful” within the meaning of  sections 2511 or 
2520 was interpreted the way it is generally constructed in federal criminal statutes and 
223
 .Id at 92. The analogy was based upon a New Jersey case where the husband unsuccessfully tried to 
suppress love letters that had been discovered by the wife in file cabinets she had full access to . See 
DelPresto v. DelPresto, 235 A. 2d 240 ( App. Div. 1967).
224 See discussion infra of White and other courts not viewing e-mail stored in computers in the home or 
workplace as “ in electronic storage” under state and federal Stored Communications Acts.
225 See fn. 282 supra and accompanying text.
226 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2511 (West 2000). 
227 See Citron v. Citron, 722 F. 2d 14 (2d Cir. 1983); Kratz v. Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463 ( E.D. Pa. 1979).
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was not limited to knowingly violating the statute; “willful” has the broader meaning of  
reckless disregard of a known legal duty.228  As elaborated by a leading case :
The word [willful] often denotes an act which is intentional or knowing or 
voluntary, as distinguished from accidental.  But when used in a criminal
statute, it generally means an act done with a bad purpose; without 
justifiable excuse; stubbornly, obstinately, perversely.  The word is also 
employed to characterize a thing done without ground for believing it is 
lawful, or conduct marked by careless disregard whether or not one has 
the right so to act.229
Clearly, accidental or negligent violations of the statute will not satisfy the fault 
requirement in sections 2511 and 2520 of the ECPA.  It is enough, however, that the 
interception was done without justifiable excuse, stubbornly, obstinately, perversely or 
without ground for believing it was lawful or with careless disregard whether or not one 
had the right to act230  “Willfully” may be treated as a factual question for the jury in 
many cases.  Illustrative of this point is the court's decision in Citron v. Citron. 231
There, Fiona Citron taped conversations between her husband and their adopted children, 
Steven and Alisande.232  She continued to tape the conversations after consulting her 
attorney.233  After discovering that some of his conversations with the children had been 
recorded Casper, Steven and Alisande brought a damage action under section 2520 of the 
228 290 U.S. 389, 394-95 (1993).
229 See id.
230 See Citron, 722 F. 2d 14; see also Kratz, 477 F. Supp. 463; Heggy v. Heggy, 944 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir. 
1991).
231
  722 F. 2d  14. 
232 See id. at 15. 
233 See id.
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Federal Wiretap Act.234  The  Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of 
the complaint after the jury in a special verdict found that Fiona had not acted 
intentionally or recklessly in taping the conversations.  235
Citron also reflects the general view taken by courts that the “willfulness” 
standard in the criminal law provision   - section 2511 - has the same meanings as in the 
damage section  - section 2520.236  The damage provision of  Title I provides that a “good 
faith reliance on  . . . a legislative authorization or a statutory authorization” constitutes a 
defense.237  This section tracks the general notion of “willfulness” required for negligence 
but is generally regarded as specifically addressing “ good faith” on the part of law 
enforcement officials or their assistants.238 State courts have construed “willfully” under 
state wiretap acts similarly.239 Although there is ambiguity in the fault requirement since 
recklessness is sufficient, it is clear that a jury determination that the defendant acted with 
a good faith belief that her conduct was lawful240
The ECPA substituted “intentional” for “willfully” in section 2511 and added 
"intentional" to portions of section 2520.241   Courts generally do not consider this change 
to alter the pre-ECPA view that reckless satisfied the fault requirement.242
234 See id.
235 See id. at 16.
236 See  id .  
237 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2520 (d)(1) (West 2000).
238
 See Citron, 722 F.2d at 16.
239 See Fischer v. Hooper, 732 A. 2d 396 ( N.H. 1999).
240 See id.
241 See 18 U.S.C.A §§ 2511, 2520 (West 2000).
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B.  The Federal Wiretap’s Strict Exclusionary Rule
The Wiretap Act has a strict exclusionary rule.243  Section 2515 excludes any part 
of the contents of an illegally intercepted communication from being admitted into any 
legal proceedings before state or federal legislatures, courts or administrative agencies.244
Evidence is only excluded under Title I if it is the fruits of activities that constitute a 
violation of Title I.  Therefore the fruits of electronic surveillance would be admissible in 
a state court divorce or custody proceeding if surveillance was exempt from Title I 
because of the spousal marital conflict exception.245  This would also be the case if the 
electronic surveillance was exempt because the parent had authority to vicariously 
consent for the child whose conversations were recorded.246 Evidence procured from an 
interception that was not willful or intentional could also be admitted in state court 
proceedings as those interceptions are not illegal under Title I.247
The exclusionary force of Title I federal wiretap violations in state divorce or 
custody proceedings has been acknowledged by state courts.248 In In re Marriage of 
242
 need support
243 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2515 (West 2000).
244 Id.
245
   As noted earlier the Fifth Circuit and Second Circuit have recognized a limited marital conflict 
exception.  See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
246 See supra notes 58-87 and accompanying text.
247 See supra notes 203-219 and accompanying text
248 See Markham v. Markham, 265 So. 2d 59 ( Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) aff’d, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973); 
Rickenbaker v. Rickenbaker, 222 S.E.2d 463 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976), modified, 226 S. E. 2d 347 (N.C. 
1976). 
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Lopp, 249 the Supreme Court of Indiana held that it was not reversible error for a trial 
judge to hear wiretaps procured in violation of Title I where the wiretap victim claimed 
that the wiretaps were used by her spouse to blackmail her into signing a provisional 
custody order.250  The court decided that even if section 2515 generally required 
exclusion of wiretaps introduced to establish the merits of the controversy, the 
exclusionary rule was not applicable to conversations introduced to challenge the 
credibility of witnesses or to conversations that were pertinent to allegations of testimony 
defrauding the court.251  To apply the exclusionary rule of  section 2515 to such cases 
would violate the due process clause and constitute an unconstitutional impairment of 
essential functions of state judges and state sovereignty.252
While the Lopp case represents an important exception to the exclusionary rule 
the courts reasoning is flawed.  The state sovereignty case relied upon in Lopp  was 
National League of Cities v. Usery.253 National League of Cities held that Federal 
Commerce Clause  legislation imposing a  minimum wage requirement on local 
government entities violated state sovereignty.254  The minimum wage holding of  
National League of Cities was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio  Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.255  In two subsequent cases, however, the Supreme Court has found federal 
249
  378 N.E.2d 414 (Ind. 1978).
250 See id. at 422 (noting that circumstances rendered court's review of tapes obtained not reversible error).
251 See id.  at 423 (noting that it would be illogical to apply exclusionary rule under certain circumstances).
252
 See id. (noting potential issues of federalism).
253 426 U.S. 833 ( 1976).
254 See id. (striking down mandatory minimum wage for state employees).
255 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause to violate state sovereignty.256  However, 
in Testa v. Katt257 the Court held that federal legislation requiring state courts to enforce 
federally created causes of action does not violate state sovereignty. Lopp is clearly 
inconsistent with Testa v. Katt.
C. No Exclusionary Rule Under Title II
As noted earlier there is no exclusionary rule explicitly in Title II.  There is no 
basis for implying an exclusionary rule because Section 2708 specifically states that the 
remedies under Title II are limited to those that are enumerated.  258 As a consequence 
even if access to e-mail or voicemail violates the Stored Communications Act, the e-mail 
or voicemail would be admissible in divorce or custody proceedings in state court.
D.  Exclusion of Evidence for Privacy Intrusion Tort Invasions
    The absence of an exclusionary rule under Title II means evidence from the fruits of 
invasions of privacy through illegal access to e-mail and voicemail  is admissible in 
divorce and custody proceedings under the Federal Stored Communications Act.  As 
suggested above conduct that violates Title II also may constitute an invasion of privacy 
under common law tort.  Does the common law of torts provide an independent basis for 
excluding evidence?  I think the best answer is that the fact that evidence is acquired in 
the commission of a tort is not by itself a sufficient reason for excluding the evidence if it 
is relevant or material in a subsequent civil or criminal court proceeding.  As a general 
256 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 ( 1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 ( 1992). 
257
  330 U.S. 336 (1947)
258 See 18 U.S.C.A. §  2708.               .
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matter there is no common law exclusionary rule.  In cases where the government 
violates constitutional provisions such as the Fourth Amendment, a rule excluding 
introduction of the fruits of the illegal search has been adopted by the Court as a 
deterrence to police and on the basis that the government as guardian of our rights should 
not benefit from acting illegally.259  In some instances (like Title I) the legislature has 
adopted an exclusionary rule to enforce standards in statutes.  These exclusionary rules 
express the exception judgment that primacy over the integrity of fact finding and justice 
dispensing of courts should be given to enforcing the prohibited statutory conduct.  In the 
case of constitutional or legislative exclusionary rules, exclusion of evidence is designed 
as a means for enforcing the constitutional or legislative standards and policies that are in 
place.  
Remedies that are built into the remedies that are part of our  longstanding 
common law tort traditions  are viewed by courts as sufficient to further tort policies of 
compensation of tort victims and deterrence of tortious conduct.  Compensatory tort 
damages include money for physical and emotional pain and suffering as well as out of 
pocket economic loss.  Deterrence is promoted indirectly in granting compensatory 
damages awards through insurance rates.260  Direct deterrence is promoted through 
punitive damage awards.261 Given this it is not surprising that there is little or no 
authority to exclude relevant and material evidence in custody or divorce proceedings on 
the basis that the evidence is the fruit of conduct that constitutes a common law tort 
259 See Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 9.5 (3d Ed. West Group 2000).
260
 For a general discussion of the role of compensatory and punitive damages and insurance on deterrence 
in tort law, see, Christie, The Law of Torts 735 (West Group 3d Ed. 1997).
261 Id.
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violation.  There may be cases where a court might exclude evidence in a civil 
proceeding on the basis of improper conduct of parties or lawyers in those proceedings.  
In Shoney’s v. Lewis, 262  for example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky excluded 
introduction of evidence that was procured by one of the lawyers before the court in 
violation of a code of professional conduct rule. 263 In that case, however, the court was 
exercising its authority to sanction conduct that was unethical by a lawyer who is an 
officer of the court system.
IV.  Minimization of Privacy Invasions  By Protective Orders In Discovery
As suggested in sections II and III of this article Title I and Title II of the ECPA have 
been construed to allow for the electronic surveillance of communications or 
conversations without a filtering mechanism that would minimize invasions of privacy of 
innocent persons – those persons communicating or conversing about matters unrelated 
to the legitimate justification for the electronic surveillance.  The absence of  a filtering 
mechanism for minimization is a serious problem because significant invasions of 
privacy occur and are sanctioned by law even though there is no justification for the 
privacy invasions.  The minimization problems arises in two related situations : (1) where 
the ECPA allows for the electronic surveillance of conversations  or the unauthorized 
access to digital communications of innocent persons, and (2)  where the content of the 
conversation or communication may be admitted in a judicial proceeding because of the 
absence of an exclusionary rule.
262
 . 875 S. W. ed 514 ( Ky. 1994).
263
  The rule was SCR 3.130 Rule 4.2 ( prohibiting exparte communications between lawyer party 
represented by another lawyer.
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In this section I examine the extent to which privacy protection in discovery rules 
and under state and federal constitutions may be utilized to function as de facto
exclusionary rules that minimize the introduction of innocent person's conversations or 
communications into records of judicial proceedings.  Preventing introduction of 
innocent personal conversations or communications into court records is important for 
privacy protection because judicial records are probably the most public in our legal 
system.
The ECPA does not provide for exclusion of innocent person's conversations or 
communications in two instances.  There is no exclusion under Title I in cases where 
courts recognize an exception to unauthorized interceptions of conversations in marital 
conflicts or for parents intercepting the conversations of their minor children.  Although 
Title I has a strong exclusionary rule it does not apply because there has been no violation 
of the Wiretap Act.  Perhaps more importantly there is no exclusion under Title II in any 
case where e-mail or voicemail is accessed even if the access violates Title II.  However, 
privacy rights recognized in discovery rules and federal and state constitutions provide 
rules for preventing innocent persons communications or conversations from introduction 
into judicial proceedings. 
F.  Constitutionally Based Privacy Rights
There are two traditions of privacy rights under the United States constitution and 
the constitutions of several states.  264  Decisional privacy rights protect independence of 
decisions for matters such as abortion.  Informational privacy rights recognize a right of 
persons to decide whether the government shall have access to highly personal or 
264
 . Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,599 (1977).
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intimate information about them.  Informational privacy rights are protected under  
unreasonable search and seizure provisions in the federal and state constitutions.  These 
rights are also protected under the due process clauses of state and federal 
constitutions.265 Compelled disclosure of highly personal or intimate information in the 
discovery process triggers this right.  This privacy right compels courts to balance 
privacy interests with the need to know.266  In divorce and custody  cases where there are 
requests for  disclosure of intercepted conversations or stored e-mail and voicemail in the 
discovery process  this constitutionally based informational privacy right may be utilized 
to preclude innocent conversations or communications from access in discovery.
State and federal discovery rules also provide for privacy rights that would restrict 
discovery of innocent conversations or communications in divorce and custody cases.
Under Rule 26 (c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure courts are  authorized to limit 
discovery and provide protective orders when data sought would cause “unreasonable 
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression or burden.267  State discovery rules generally 
track Rule 26 (c).268  While the language in Rule 26 (c) and analogous state rules do not 
specifically mention privacy, it is clear that serious invasions of privacy are included.269
The availability of a protective order under discovery rules to protect privacy is 
265
 For a general discussion of  constitutionally based privacy right theory and balancing of interest test see 
Richard Turkington, Legacy of the Warren and Brandeis Article, The Emerging Unencumbered 
Constitutional Right to Informational Privacy, 10 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 479 ( 1990); Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, 
Seccrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 1, 145  ( 1991).
266
 . Turkington Id. , Kreimer Id.
267
 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 (c ).
268
 . ( See Rasmussen v. South Florida Blood Service, 500 So. 2d 533 ( Fla. 1987), Stenger v. Lehigh Valley 
Hospital Center, 609 A.2d. 796 ( Pa. 1992)
269 Id.
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determined by balancing privacy interests with the need to know very much like the 
balancing test under the constitutional right to privacy discussed above.270
Conclusion
Use of electronic technology to capture conversations or images and to access e-
mail or voicemail is not uncommon in marriage and custody disputes between married 
persons and parents.  Surreptitious use of this technology invades the privacy of the non -
consenting party.  Accessing the legality of these activities is complicated because a 
variety of legal institutions are implicated.  In this article I have primarily examined 
whether electronic surveillance in domestic disputes violates federal and state stored 
communications and wiretap acts and the common law privacy intrusion tort. Wiretap 
acts generally restrict surreptitious recording of conversations with two limited 
exceptions. A minority of courts  allow spouses to record conversations of other spouses 
on the extension phone in the marital home.  There is greater authority to record 
conversations of a minor child on the extension phone in the home. Recently, a 
potentially more expansive third exception has been adopted by almost all of the courts 
that have considered it.  This exception would authorize parents to vicariously consent to 
a wiretap on behalf of their minor child if the parent believes it is in the child’s best 
interest.  If the vicarious consent rule is adopted, state and federal wiretap acts that 
provide a one party consent defense are not violated.
I argue that the vicarious consent doctrine ought to be rejected primarily for two 
reasons: (1) because the intercepting spouse is not sufficiently accountable for invasions 
270
 . Some courts view the constitutionally based privacy right to be incorporated into the limitations on 
privacy contained in Rule 26 ( c) and analogous state discovery rules,  see Rasmussen,Stenger Id. See 
Farnsworth v. Procter& Gamble Co., 758 F. 2d 1545 ( 11th Cir. 1985).
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of privacy to a non consenting third party who is conversing with the child and (2) 
because the vicarious consent doctrine is incomprehensible in view of state joint custody 
laws.
Access to e-mail and voicemail is primarily regulated by state and federal stored 
communications acts. This is a developing area of law and there are few appellate court 
decisions that construe the stored communications acts in domestic conflict cases.  The 
clear trend is to find these statutes not applicable because e-mail stored in the home is not 
“ in electronic storage.”  Beyond  that , even if stored communications acts are violated , 
the fruits of such illegality may still be admitted in civil court proceedings because, 
unlike wiretap acts, stored  communications acts do not contain an exclusionary rule.
Electronic surveillance in domestic conflicts may be tortious under the common 
law privacy intrusion tort.  This tort fills a void because it would reach silent video 
surveillance – an activity that is not regulated under wiretap and stored communications 
acts. In the examination of privacy intrusion tort cases it is clear that surreptitious audio 
and video surveillance in domestic conflict cases may constitute tortious conduct even if 
the conduct does not violate wiretap and stored electronic communications acts. I 
examine the extent to which parties may have reasonable expectations of privacy in 
conversations and communications within the meaning of the privacy intrusion tort. I also 
conclude that is clear that it would be tortious for a spouse to access e-mail stored in a 
home computer if the e-mail is stored in a segregated e-mail account and the parties have 
maintained separate private passwords.
Much evidence that is obtained by illegal electronic surveillance may be 
admissible in marriage and custody proceedings because violations of stored electronic 
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communications acts and the privacy intrusion tort do not provide a basis for excluding 
evidence in civil court proceedings. I suggest that protective orders based upon discovery 
rules and constitutional privacy rights may provide a way to protect privacy by excluding 
some communications or images from admissibility in judicial records.
